The danger of war was not acute enough to keep Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in London. With his fishing rods and guns sticking ostentatiously out of his limousine, Mr. Chamberlain left for Scotland to play trout streams and shoot grouse with King George. Lloyd's pointed out in London last week that, although they stopped writing war-risk insurance on British property some months ago, and although they have been unwilling to cover either the risk of war breaking out in Europe or of Franklin Roosevelt announcing he will seek a Third Term, they were still quoting cargo insurance at far below "wartime rates." Thus, although the rate on South African copper shipped to Germany was raised last week from .025% to .125% the latter figure spells "Peace" in comparison with the 42% premium charged on shipments bound for war-torn Spain.
Up and down Europe a new factor working for peace was sighted by anxious millions in the behavior last week of U. S. Ambassadors. In London, after the British Cabinet had reviewed the Czechoslovak situation for nearly three hours, U. S. Ambassador Joseph Patrick Kennedy was invited in for an hour's conference. Next day Mr. Kennedy was back in Downing Street, conferring this time with Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax, and red-ink London placards shrieked this as good news. Mr. Kennedy, interviewed by transatlantic telephone, told the Hearst Boston American, ''No war is going to break out during the rest of 1938."
Frank Trelawny Arthur Aston-Gwatkin, Lord Runciman's Man Friday. It was taken by Sudeten German Führer Konrad Henlein to Berchtesgaden last week and there laid before the German Führer. Details were kept secret but it was understood that Plan No. 3 embodied these main points: 1) a three-month truce to be declared, to give time for much further negotiation between the Sudeten Germans, the Czechoslovak Government and other interested parties; 2) Czechoslovakia to become after these negotiations a Federal State composed of Gaue or "Cantons" modeled on the Swiss Federal State, whose structure has often been compared to that of the U. S. The Sudetens complain this would give their Gaue only a rough equivalent to American States' rights, whereas they have demanded "autonomy" comparable to British dominion status.
Viscount Runciman's entourage began complaining fortnight ago that they have found Konrad Henlein nothing but a "straw man," and last week the Sudeten Führer went to Berchtesgaden only to take the orders of his boss, Führer Hitler—for the fourth time this year.
Present with the No. 1 Nazi were No. 2 Nazi Göring, No. 3 Nazi Goebbels and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, who arrived from Berlin with what was said to be a personal piece of advice to Adolf Hitler from Neville Chamberlain.
This had been verbally delivered in Berlin by the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, who brought it by air from London. As Sir Nevile was leaving Croydon, he added an E. Phillips Oppenheim touch by portentously remarking to cameramen : "You had better be quick—this is the last chance you'll get."
Henlein, after four hours' conference with Hitler, returned to his home in the village of As. Three days later one fact seemed obvious: the "strawman" had been instructed to reject Plan No. 3, to compromise on nothing, to hold out for full, unqualified Sudeten autonomy. The Czech Cabinet then met with President Benes and drafted its "last" offer to which a response was expected from Dictator Hitler this week in one of his numerous speeches at the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg.
Meanwhile, local bigwigs of the Sudeten German Party were reported from Czechoslovakia as be ginning to show signs of fear lest they be thrust aside by Nazis from Germany, much as in Vienna the Austrian Nazis have lost all the biggest plums to German Nazis. Supplementing cables to this effect was a statement by pro-Czech Chairman George Boochever of the American-Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, who stepped off the Dutch liner Nieuw Amster dam in Manhattan. "In my talks with Sudeten Germans," said Mr. Boochever, "I gained the impression that they had no real wish to be annexed to Germany. . . . I think Henlein is but the mouthpiece for Hitler's views and if it were not for the propaganda and subsidies from Germany received by Henlein and his group there would be no agitation. . . ."
